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Abstract
This essay introduces the notion of practical meaning by looking at a certain kind of procedural 
systems — the  motor  system  — that  play  a  central  role  in  computational  models  of  motor 
behavior. I argue that a satisfactory account of the content of the representations computed by 
motor systems (motor commands) has to appeal to a distinctively practical kind of meaning. 
Defending the explanatory relevance of motor representation and of its semantic properties in a 
computational explanation of motor behavior, my argument concludes that practical meanings 
play  a  central  role  in  an  adequate  explanation  of  motor  behavior  that  is  based  on  these 
computational models. In the second part of this essay, I generalize and clarify the notion of 
practical meaning, and I defend the intelligibility of practical meanings against two important 
objections.
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1 Introduction
Suppose that agents and, more generally, systems come, at any given time, with a fixed set of 
elementary operations.  An operation is elementary for a system if the system can perform it but 1
cannot perform a proper part (Fodor (1968, p. 629)): the system performs an elementary 
operation directly or immediately, that is, without thereby performing any other operation as its 
proper part. Call an ability of a system elementary at a time t if it is an ability to perform an 
operation that is elementary for that system at t.  
On the suppositions that systems come, at any given time, with a fixed set of elementary 
operations and elementary abilities, that different systems possibly come with different sets of 
elementary abilities, and that even the same system may change its stock of elementary abilities 
through time, we may relativize an assignment of meaning, at a time t, to an instruction for a 
system so that the assignment takes into account that system’s elementary abilities at t. An 
assignment of practical meaning is an assignment of meaning to an instruction that is relative in 
a distinctive way to systems’ elementary abilities at particular times. 
In the first part of this essay (§2), I introduce this notion of practical meaning by looking 
at a particular procedural system (the motor system) that plays a central role in computational 
models of motor behavior. I argue that we need to appeal to a distinctively practical kind of 
meaning in order to give a satisfactory account of the meaning of the representations that, on 
these models, are computed by the motor system (motor commands). If this is correct, a 
satisfactory psychological explanation of motor behavior based on those computational models is 
 Here I am using “systems” standardly as it has been used in the philosophical literature since Dennett 1971: as 1
anything — be it a human being, a machine, an alien — whose behavior we are trying to explain in terms of 
attributions of mental properties (i.e. mental states and their content or dispositions to behavior).
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one that assigns a central explanatory role to practical meanings. In the second part (§3), I clarify 
and generalize this notion of practical meaning, I review the standard argument for the existence 
of elementary abilities, and I defend the intelligibility of practical meanings against an important 
objection.
2 Motor Systems and Practical Meaning
2.1 Motor Commands and the Denotational Model
The computational approach to the study of motor behavior is one of the most successful areas of 
research in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. According to computational 
models of motor behavior, a motor task such as, for example, the task of pouring wine on a glass 
(Figure 1) involves a series of sensorimotor transformations that translate the intentions of the 
agent together with visual and other sensory information about the location of the targeted 
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Figure 1: Example of a motor task
objects (bottle and glass) and the limbs into a series of motor commands. Such motor commands 
are fed into the motor system that executes them sequentially to produce an output — e.g. the 
movement of the hand that pours the wine on the glass (Miall and Wolpert 1996, Wolpert 1997, 
Kawato and Wolpert 1998, Kawato 1999, Wolpert and Ghahramani 2000, Trappenberg 2009). 
Although these computational models differ in detail, they all share some important 
features. First of all, they all take motor commands to be the outputs of the so-called motor 
planning. Motor planning is a process by which an extrinsic task goal (cfr. Figure 2) such as a 
desired trajectory (cfr. Figure 3) or desired state of the arm (cfr. Figure 4) are translated into 
commands
Figure 2:Wolpert's representation of the motor system (1997, 209-210) 
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that can then be executed by the motor system; second, in these computational models, 
motor commands figure as inputs to the computation performed by the motor system that may 
change the state of the arm (cfr. Figure 2), align the trajectory of the hand with the agent’s 
intentions (cfr. Figure 3), or achieve the control of an object as the agent desired (cfr. Figure 4). 
As made explicit by Figure 2, these outputs generate sensory feedback that is then taken into 
account in the generation of the next motor command. Thus, for example, in the task of lifting a 
can to one’s lips, a desired state might be the acceleration of the hand’s speed as registered by the 
sensory feedback, or the change of trajectory to reach the lips in response to an obstacle (Wolpert 
& Kawato 1998, p. 1317). 
Figure 4: Kawato's representation of the motor system (1999, 719) 
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Figure 3: Trappenber's representation of the motor system (2009, 271)
In these computational models, then, the role of motor commands can be characterized as 
twofold: 
(i) motor commands translate desires and intentions that the agent might have into a 
representation that can then be interpreted and executed by the motor system;
(ii)  motor commands prescribe the execution of a given motor task.
 At a slightly less intuitive, and slightly more abstract, level, we can say that the functional role 
of the motor command in these models is that of being the output of a first computational process 
— i.e. motor planning — and that of being the input to a second computational process — i.e. 
that by the motor system leading to the execution of the motor task.
Qua outputs of the motor planning and qua inputs to the computation by the motor 
system, it is plausible to take motor commands to be representations of sort.  Indeed, it is quite 2
natural to think of motor commands as linguistic representations, on the model of programming 
languages’ commands. However, for the purpose of this discussion, we do not need to lean on the 
assumption that motor commands must be linguistic. We may leave it open that motor commands 
are more akin to pictorial instructions (or imperatival pictures) such as architectural plans or 
road-sidewarning signs than they are to linguistic representations.3
 For a similar argument from the role of motor commands in motor planning to their representational nature, see 2
also Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014, pp. 123-124.
 For the notion of ‘imperatival pictures’, see Kjørup 1978, pp. 64-66. For examples of imperatival pictures, see 3
Greenberg manuscript, p. 6. 
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Figure 5: Example of imperatival 
pictures
Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to at least assume that for them to play the role they are 
supposed to play in these computational models, motor commands must be sorts of 
representations. Call this assumption according to which motor commands can figure in a 
satisfactory computational explanations of motor behavior only if they are sorts of 
representations the ‘Explanatory Constraint’ for it puts a representational constraint on the 
explanatory power of computational approaches to motor behavior. The Explanatory Constraint 
can be justified in a variety of ways to which I will return later.  For the moment, I will take it as 4
a plausible working hypothesis.
Just like imperatives in public languages such as English or like pictorial instructions 
such as road-sidewarning signs or architectural plans, motor commands are not representations in 
the sense that they are correct or incorrect, true or false. Nonetheless, they are species of 
representations: they are, to use the words of psychologist and neuroscientist Tulving (1985, 
387-8), “prescriptive representations.” Qua representations, motor commands must have 
meaning. If so, then it makes sense to ask what their meaning is.
In order to reach a preliminary answer to this question, let me describe in some more 
detail the workings of the motor system. As already noted, motor commands are supposed to 
translate the one’s desires and intentions in a form that enables them to be processed by the 
motor system —i.e. are supposed to translate goals, desires, and intentions procedurally (the 
procedural hypothesis). Whose goals, desires, or intentions? Presumably, the agent’s. If so, the 
 According to Fodor (1981), there is no computation without representation: a computation in the relevant sense is a 4
causal chain of computer states and the links in the chain are operations on semantically interpreted formulas in a 
machine code. To think of any system as performing a computation is, in Fodor (1981, 180)’s words “to raise 
questions about the nature of the code in which it computes and the semantic properties of the symbols in the code.” 
This Fodorian idea that computation requires representations — that is, that computation requires the states of the 
computation to have semantic properties — has fallen in disgrace in recent times. There are ways of understanding it 
on which it is clearly false (Egan 1995, Piccinini 2008, Chalmers 2011). As I explain later, my argument does not 
rely on this Fodorian claim.
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input to the translation by the motor planning must be some content available at the personal 
level (the personal level input hypothesis).   Finally, these intentions that are procedurally 5
translated bit by bit — the bits being the smallest parts of the complex intentions (the discrete 
hypothesis). The smallest parts of a complex intention are basic intentions: an intention is basic 
if it is an intention to perform a task that is basic for the agent — in the sense that that agent can 
perform it intentionally without performing intentionally any part of it (Danto 1965). An 
intention is complex if it is not basic. According to this way of cashing out the discrete 
hypothesis, the smallest bits of the complex intention that are translated by the motor system are 
This assumption comes to the fore when we are told that the sensory feedback that is produced by the execution of 5
a motor task is to be “registered” by the subject, who thereby updates their intentions and feeds them again into the 
motor planning. For example, Wolpert, Doya, and Kawato (2003, p. 594) write:  “The motor control loop (a) 
involves generating motor commands that cause changes in the state of my own body. Depending on this new state 
and the outside world I receive sensory feedback. The social interaction loop (b) involves me generating motor 
commands that cause communicative signals. These signals when perceived by another person can cause changes in 
their internal mental state. These changes can lead to actions which are, in turn, perceived by me.” Although this 
personal level input assumption is implicit in many descriptions of the motor system and it both simplifies and 
makes more perspicuous my discussion, it is not needed for my argument: it might very well be that what is 
translated into motor commands are desires and intentions that are not accessible at the personal level and that there 
is a further layer between the level of the agent and the motor system at which it makes still sense to talk of 
intentions. 
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Figure 6: One-One Model
basic intentions.6
In addition to these three hypotheses that are shared by most, if not all, descriptions of the 
motor system, to facilitate my presentation, I will make one further assumption: I will assume 
that bits of intentions procedurally translate into a single motor command (one-one model). 
Figure 6 illustrates the one-one model: a complex intention to pour wine on a glass divides into 
parts — i.e. basic intentions — and each of these basic intentions is mapped into a single motor 
command. This is certainly not the only way we can think of the relation between basic 
intentions and motor commands. We could envisage a different model, on which basic intentions 
themselves are translated into a series (or some other arrangement) of motor commands, not just 
into a single one.  In other words, basic intentions could stand into a one-to-many relation to 
motor commands (One-many model, Figure 7). As I explain at the end, whether we assume the 
one-one model or the one-many model is immaterial to my main argument. For expository 
purposes, however, it will be convenient to start by assuming the one-one model. I will make 
sure to discharge this assumption later in the essay.
 The discrete assumption may be doubted on philosophical ground. See Thompson 2008, pp. 107-8 for an argument 6
that could be used against the discrete hypothesis. Lavin (2013) has argued against the necessity of positing basic 
actions. Unfortunately, I cannot consider Thompson’s or Lavin’s argument here. For a critical response to 
Thompson’s argument, see Setiya 2012, pp. 288-9.
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   
                Figure 7: One-many model  
Combining together the procedural hypothesis, the personal level input hypothesis, the 
discrete hypothesis, and the one-one model, we can describe the working of the motor system as 
follows: each basic part of an agent’s intention to perform a complex task is translated 
procedurally into a motor command. The motor system then executes the task that is prescribed 
by the input motor command (Figure 8: blue arrow = input; orange arrow = output):7
Figure 8: Input-output
Returning to our main question — what is the meaning of a motor command? — our 
discussion thus far suggests that we describe the function of a motor command as issuing a 
This picture simplifies things a bit, for it ignores the function of the motor system that consists in taking in the 7
sensory feedback and in responding to such feedback with the production of new motor commands. This 
simplification will not affect the main claim of this section for it is undeniable that at least one of the functions of the 
motor system is to output the execution of a motor task.
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Figure 7: Input and Output
prescription whose content is a task (Figure 9: red arrow = denote).  Call this the denotational 
model of the meaning of motor commands: according to it, the procedural translation of ones’ 
intentions to perform a task τ is a representation, a motor command, that denotes τ. So, on this 
denotational model, a motor command denotes a task — i.e. the task that the motor command 
prescribes to the motor system.
The denotational model dovetails well with a particular approach to the semantics of 
imperatives that has been put forward in recent years (Lascarides and Asher 2003, Barker 2012), 
according to which the meaning (or denotation) of an imperative such as (1) is an action — i.e., 
(1) means, or denotes, the action of dancing:8
(1) Dance!
What is an action? As Barker (2012, 1) puts it:9
Actions change the world. This means that actions can be characterized by before-and-
after pictures, that is, by a picture of the world before the action is performed, and a 
picture of the world afterwards. Technically, then, an action will be a relation over 
worlds, a set whose elements are ordered pairs <w, wi> where w is the world before the 
action and wi is the world after the action in question has been performed.
 This is by no means the only possible semantic treatment of imperatives in natural language, although it is the one 8
that makes it easier for me to introduce the notion of practical meanings. See Charlow 2014b for a helpful overview 
on the semantics for imperatives and Charlow 2014a for possible problems with the sort of semantics I consider in 
the text. Still other approaches to the semantics of imperatives are the performative view (Lewis 1970), the modal 
approach (cfr. Grosz 2009, Kaufmann 2011), and the preference based approach (cfr. Starr ms).
 See also Pavese 2015, 2-3.9
 11
Figure 9: The Denotational Model
According to Barker (2012, 4), actions can be modeled as sets of ordered pairs of inputs and 
outputs — their inputs being possible states of the world before the action is performed and their 
outputs being possible states of the world that result from performing the action. Thus, for 
example, the meaning of an imperative such as (1) is the set of world pairs in which the second 
world is a continuation of the first world in which the addressee dances. Call this view of the 
meaning of imperatives ‘Action Semantics’.
Two observations about Action Semantics.  First of all, according to it, the denotation of 
(1) is the action of the addressee’s of dancing in some way or other. Thus, the denotation of (1) 
will encompass ordered pairs in which the second world is one where the addressee dances tango 
and other ones in which the addressee dances salsa. This seems correct as a hypothesis about the 
meaning of imperatives in English: for example,  (1) does not specify which particular method 
one is to use in order to comply with the prescription it issues.
Secondly, according to Barker’s semantics, the denotation of an imperative is an action to 
be performed by the addressee.  This can be modeled by making the relevant action centered on 
the addressee: instead of thinking of w and wi simply as worlds, we think of them, following 
Lewis (1979), as centered worlds (or situations) — indicated as <w, c> and <wi, c> — where the 
center is the addressee at a particular time and location. The result is a semantics that more 
perspicuously models the role of the addressee in the denotation of an imperative such as (1): on 
this semantics, (1) denotes a set of ordered pairs of the form <<w, c>, <wi, c>>. 
Extending Barker’s proposal to the semantics of motor commands, we may then think of 
the meaning of a motor command C! as a task, where a task is modeled as the set of centered 
world-pairs in which the second centered world is a continuation of the first centered world in 
which the motor system executes the task of C-ing.
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All in all, the denotational model sketched thus far is a plausible semantic analysis of 
motor commands. In what follows, I will argue, however, that although it is partially correct, the 
denotational model of motor commands is incomplete: the denotation of motor commands — i.e. 
the task they denote — cannot be the only dimension that there is to their meaning.
2.2 Towards a Two-Dimensional Model
In a nutshell, my argument for thinking that the denotational model is incomplete goes as 
follows. Tasks can be performed in different ways and in accordance with different methods. In 
these computational models, the motor planning is the process by which a task intended by the 
agent is translated into a motor command and by which the particular method by which a task is 
to be performed by the motor system is selected across a variety of different options.  If motor 
commands are to be the outputs of this process of motor planning, they must bear record of the 
method by which the task they represent is to be performed. Hence, the task they denote cannot 
exhaust their meaning.
Let me now go through this argument carefully. The first premise is that tasks can be 
performed in accordance with different methods. This statement sounds like a platitude, but it is 
helpful, nonetheless, to draw it out with an example. Consider again the motor task that consists 
in moving the hand to a target location. There are an infinite number of possible paths that the 
hand could move along, and for each of these paths there are an infinite number of velocity 
profiles (trajectories) the hand could follow. Even after having specified the hand path and 
velocity, each location of the hand along the path can be achieved by multiple combinations of 
joint angles, and each arm configuration can be achieved by many different muscle activations 
(Wolpert 1997, p. 2). In this sense of ‘method’, the same motor task can be performed by a 
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variety of different methods.
Now, suppose that, in accordance with the denotational model, a motor command’s 
meaning were simply its denotation and that its denotation were a task or an action that the motor 
system could execute by means of at least two different methods. In this case, the input provided 
by the motor command would be ambiguous: it would not provide all the information needed by 
the motor system for an unambiguous computation. This restriction suggests that if a motor 
command is to represent a task, for it to provide an unambiguous input to the motor system, the 
motor command would have to represent a task as to be executed in accordance with a 
particular method.
That motor commands also must prescribe the method by which the task is to be 
performed in addition to the task itself is shown in these computational models by the fact that in 
them, motor commands are the outputs of the process of motor planning (e.g. Wolpert 1997, 
Figure 2) which consists in figuring out a solution to the problem of how to perform a particular 
task (Figure 10, as before orange = output; blue = input).10
 Sometimes, motor planning is called ‘motor command generator’. For example, see Trappenberg 2009, 271 and 10
Figure 3.
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Figure 10:The role of motor planning
As Wolpert (1997, 2) puts it:
Motor planning can be considered as the computational process that consists in 
selecting a single solution or pattern of behavior at the levels in the motor 
hierarchy, from the many alternatives which are consistent with the task.
Figure 11 (from Wolpert 1997, 3) shows the motor hierarchy. In it, the same task goal — e.g. 
reaching for the glass on the table — corresponds to different paths the hand could take, which, 
in turn, correspond to different possible trajectories that can be executed by different movements 
of the joint, and these movements, in turn, correspond to different muscle activations that can be 
prescribed by still different neural commands.
In this sense, motor planning is the process by which a 
single task goal is mapped into a  motor command by making a 
choice at each level of the motor hierarchy.  If a motor command is 
to be the output of motor planning so conceived, then it must 
encode the solution to the problem tackled by the motor planning 
process. Hence, it must record the sort of method that the motor 
planning has arrived at through its selection through the motor hierarchy. This requirement 
suggests that a motor command does not simply denote a task but it represents a task as to be 
executed in a particular way by a certain method. So, for example, the motor task of moving the 
hand to a target location will be represented as to be executed along a certain path, at a certain 
trajectory, through a certain combination of joint angles, by different muscle activations, and so 
on. In this way, the fact that the motor command is the output of 
the motor planning ensures that its input is not ambiguous but is 
instead, univocal, for its instruction can now be executed only in one way. 
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Figure 11: The Motor Hierarchy
So, the denotational model is incomplete. Motor commands do not just denote, or just 
represent, tasks. A specification of their contents must include mention of the methods in 
accordance with which they prescribe a task is to be performed. Now, as we have just seen, a 
method stands to a task in a many-to-one relation: the same task can be performed by more than 
one method. Moreover, a method is always a method to perform a specifiable task (Girard 1989, 
Pavese 2015, 2-5); finally, the execution of a method M outputs the task that M is a method to 
perform. In this sense, a method fixes, or determines, that task. 
Because methods stand to tasks into a many-to-one relation and can be said to determine 
tasks, several people have pointed out (Girard 1989, chapter 1, Moschovakis 1994, p. 17, 
Muskens 2005, and Pavese, 2015, 3) that methods stand to tasks as Fregean meanings (or senses) 
stand to their denotations (or referents). Consequently, methods are plausible candidates for 
being the meanings (or senses) of motor commands.
This conclusion suggests a more sophisticated picture of the semantics of motor 
commands. On this picture, we want 
to distinguish between the denotation 
(or referent) of a motor command — 
or a task — and something we might 
call the meaning (or sense) of a motor 
command (Figure 12: black = 
expresses; green = fixes).
On this two-dimensional model, a motor command has a meaning (or sense) as well as a 
denotation (or referent). Just like on the denotational model, on the two-dimensional model, a 
motor command still denotes (represents) the task that it prescribes. In addition, it prescribes (or 
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Figure 12: The Two-Dimensional Model
represents) that task as to be performed in a certain way. This further aspect of the meaning of a 
motor command is captured by the two-dimensional model by a further layer of meaning: a 
motor command expresses a meaning (or sense), its meaning (or sense) being the method by 
which that task is to be performed (in the sense of ‘meaning-referent’, or ‘sense-referent’ that 
goes back to Frege 1948). 
2.3 The need for distinctively practical meanings
The picture is incomplete unless we clarify what a method is. As I have argued in Pavese (2015, 
2-3), different methods can be thought of as ways of breaking down a task into sub-tasks or sub-
operations.  This idea can be illustrated by a couple of examples.11
Consider ordering alphabetically a list of names. One method is to scroll through the 
whole list and move to the top of the list the items that are first in alphabetical order among the 
items of the whole list. Another method consists in sorting into alphabetical order every 
successive two members-subset of the list. These two different methods break down the problem 
of ordering the names alphabetically into different parts. In the first case, the main parts of the 
task will be (roughly): 1) scroll down the list until you find the item that comes first 
alphabetically; 2) move that item to the top; and 3) repeat the operation until the whole list is 
alphabetically ordered from bottom to the top. In the second case, the main parts of the same task 
will be instead: 1)* divide the list into every possible combination of two successive items; 2)* 
for any of those parts, order them alphabetically; and 3)* continue for every part of the list.
Consider two different sets of directions to reach a same destination X, as shown by 
In my jargon, tasks are operations that can be performed intentionally and their execution can be attributed to the 11
person/agent. Many operations are beyond the reach of intentionality: their execution can be attributed to the motor 
system but not to the person/agent. 
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Figure 13. The first set of direction (in blue) breaks 
down the task of reaching Mole Antonelliana from 
Piazza Vittorio Veneto in Turin in a sequence of 
tasks that consists in taking via Po to the crossing 
with via San Massimo and then in turning right 
until almost reaching via Ferrari. The second set of 
directions (in grey) breaks down the same task into 
different sets: after taking via Po, it says to turn 
right on via Sant’Ottavio, to turn left on via Verdi, 
and then again right on via S. Massimo.  These 
two sets of directions are two methods to reach 
the same destination, for they break the same task – reaching the Mole Antonelliana – into 
different sequences of sub-tasks. 
Finally, consider the task of calculating the sequence of Fibonacci numbers where each 
number in the sequence is the sum of the fib(n) for a certain input n:
0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21 . . . .
In order to calculate this sequence, one could use a recursive solution or a closed solution 
(Pavese 2015, 2-3).  The task of calculating the sequence of Fibonacci numbers is broken down 
by a recursive method into many more parts than by a closed solution, as can be seen from the 
fact that, in order to calculate fib(n) for any n different from 0 or 1, a recursive method would 
require that one first calculate fib(n – 1) and fib(n – 2). By contrast, a closed solution permits 
calculating fib(n) directly (Abelson and Sussman 1983, Secs. 1.2.2-3). 
Hence, quite generally, different methods of performing a task will break down a task 
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Figure 13: Directions
into a different sequence of parts. In this sense, methods can be thought of as different ways of 
breaking that task into parts. If so, then we might think of the meaning (or sense) of a motor 
command as a way of breaking down the task that it denotes into subtasks. For example, the 
different paths the hand could take, the different possible trajectories, the different movements of 
the joint, and the different muscle activations will break that task of moving a hand to a target 
into different sequences of operations. 
We have now reached a crucial juncture in my argument. Thus far, I have shown that the 
denotational model is incomplete and suggested that we replace it with the two-dimensional 
model. According to the two-dimensional model, there are two dimensions to the meaning of a 
motor command — one dimension being its denotation and the other dimension being its sense. 
Moreover, I have argued that we think of the sense of a motor command as a way of breaking its 
denotation (a task) into parts. Now, the crucial juncture is this: these ways of breaking a task 
down into subparts must come to an end at some point. They cannot divide into subtasks 
indefinitely. Otherwise, the motor system could never complete the execution of the task. If ways 
of breaking the task into parts cannot divide into subtasks indefinitely, they must reach a set of 
“elementary” subtasks — ones that have no further proper parts.
 Now, either the set of elementary sub-tasks is relative to a system, or it is not relative to a 
system. Suppose the latter is the case — i.e. that the set of elementary sub-tasks is not relative to 
a system. In this case, we must suppose that a task together with a method will specify a 
sequence of elementary sub-tasks absolutely — it will specify a sequence of tasks that does not 
vary from system to system. The problem with this supposition is that it is not clear that the 
notion of an absolute elementary subtask even makes sense. An elementary task is, by definition, 
one that a system (or a set of systems which certain commonalities, cfr. Fodor (1968, p. 629)) 
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can perform directly, without thereby performing any other task as proper part. So, the very 
notion of an elementary task makes reference to a system, subject, or agent.  Indeed, it seems 
highly questionable that there could be a set of elementary tasks that is common to every system, 
subject, or agent — i.e. that is absolute. The very same operation may be elementary for a system 
at a time, and not elementary for another system at that time. Or it may not be elementary for a 
system at a time and become elementary for that very same system at another time. Because of 
this, it is not clear that we would be speaking intelligibly if we speak of a way of breaking down 
a task into a set of elementary operations that are common to every system.
Let me back up this claim, according to which what counts as an elementary operation 
may vary with the system and with the time, by introducing the notion of chunking, that plays an 
important role in psychological theories of motor behavior.   Chunking is a process by which a 12
sequence of elementary operations gets “chunked” into parts that then can be executed as unified 
wholes (Verwey 1996, Verwey 2001, Sakai, Kitaguchi, Hikosaka 2003). For example, through 
chunking, a sequence of elementary operations A, B, C, D, E, and F can get chunked into two big 
parts [A, B, C] and [D, E, and F]. By definition, the chunks [A, B, C] and [D, E, and F] are now 
new elementary operations for the system. For through chunking, the sequence A, B and C loses, 
so to say, theoretically interesting structure: the system comes to execute it directly, without 
executing any of its parts. It is widely thought that practice makes improvement of performance 
possible precisely through chunking, for chunking makes the processing of a motor sequence 
more efficient (Verwey 2010; Verwey and al. 2011, p. 407). 
If chunking is possible, then the set of elementary operations of a system must change 
over time, for the new chunks get to be included in the list of newly acquired elementary 
 The label “chunking” seems to go back to Miller (1956). 12
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operations. Hence, it is not only plausible that what counts as an elementary operation varies 
across systems; it is also plausible that the same system varies its elementary operations through 
time. 
If what counts as an elementary operation is relative to systems and times, and if a 
method is a way of breaking down a task into operations that are elementary, then methods must 
be relative to systems and times too. In other words, whether a way of breaking down a task into 
subtasks is a method for performing that task depends on the system one considers and on its 
stock of elementary operations. Accordingly, because an assignment of meaning or sense to a 
motor commands is an assignment of a method for the relevant system to perform the task, we 
should think of an assignment of meaning or sense to motor commands as being relative to the 
relevant motor system’s elementary abilities: what we assign to a motor command as its meaning 
will depend on the relevant system’s stock of elementary abilities. 
This completes my argument for thinking that the denotational model is incomplete. The 
meaning of motor commands cannot be exhausted by their denotations. There is a further 
meaning dimension to the meaning of motor commands — i.e. the method through which they 
prescribe that a task is to be performed. I have argued that these methods stand to tasks as 
meanings (or senses) stand to their denotation (or referent). Moreover, I pointed out that this 
further dimension of meaning is distinctively practical, for it is relative to a system’s set of 
elementary abilities. Hence, I called this further dimension “practical meaning.” 
2.4 More Support for the Two-Dimensional Model
Before moving on, let me pause to consider an alternative to the two-dimensional model that 
might seem to work just as well. Suppose that, instead of adding a further dimension to the 
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meaning of motor commands (a sense in addition to their referents), we make their referents (the 
relevant tasks) more fine-grained. One way of doing so is to take motor commands to refer to 
highly specific tasks — i.e. tasks that cannot be executed in more than one way. We could model 
such fine-grained tasks by thinking of them as sets of ordered pairs of input centered worlds and 
output centered worlds where the addressee performs a certain motor task in a very particular 
way — through a certain particular joints displacement, a certain configuration of muscles 
contractions and so on. For this purpose, we may let the output centered worlds include a very 
detailed history — whatever set of steps that is required for the motor system to go through in 
order for the task to be executed. Alternatively, we could let motor commands denote methods 
directly, rather than tasks, and banish altogether the level of meanings (or senses). In this way, by 
making the referent more fine-grained, we could obviate to the need of appealing to senses in 
addition to referents. Or so one might argue. 
 This picture has the drawback of not vindicating a very natural way of describing the 
workings of the motor system. It is very natural to describe two motor systems as executing the 
same motor task, extrinsically individuated, even though the methods that they employ are 
widely different; and it is natural to speak as if two motor commands may prescribe the same 
task, even though in different ways. Consequently, it is extremely natural to follow Action 
Semantics in taking these coarsely individuated tasks to be what commands prescribe and to 
identify these tasks that motor commands prescribe with the motor commands’ denotation. In the 
last section, I showed that the required fineness of grain can be reached by adding a further layer 
of meaning — a sense in addition to their denotation. 
The idea that motor representations denote actions or action outcomes (as opposed, for 
example, to methods for performing those actions and as opposed even to very fine-grained 
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actions that include bodily movements and muscle contractions) is actually very popular in the 
cognitive sciences (Rizzolatti et al. 2001, Gallese 2000, Gales and Metzinger 2003, Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia 2014, Levy 2016). Gallese and Metzinger (2003, 372) distinguish between BODILY 
MOVEMENTS — which are “simple physical events, and they can be represented accordingly;” 
BEHAVIORS — which are “movements that are goal-directed, i.e. which can meaningfully be 
described as directed towards a set of satisfaction conditions, but without necessarily being 
linked to an explicit and conscious representation of such conditions;” and ACTIONS — which 
are a “specific subset of goal-directed movements: a series of movements that are functionally 
integrated with a currently active goal representation as leading to a reward constitute an action.” 
Gallese and Metzinger (2003, 383) argue that motor representations are representations of 
actions in this latter sense. Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014, 120-1) concur; they argue that there 
must be motor representations of actions and action outcomes, as opposed to representations of 
joint displacements, because the same joint displacements may be involved in different actions 
marked by the presence or absence of a targeted object and because the same action outcome 
may correspond to several variations of the kinematic and dynamic features of the action. 
Relying on a variety of psychological and neuroscientific studies, Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014) 
claim that there is evidence that some markers of motor processing are correlated with action 
outcomes (extrinsically individuated) rather than narrowly individuated kinematic or dynamic 
features of an action: 
For any given marker of motor processing (such as a pattern of neuronal discharge or 
motor-evoked potentials), how can we test whether that marker carries information about 
action outcomes? The basic principle is straightforward: vary kinematic and dynamic 
features while holding constant an action outcome; and, conversely, vary action 
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outcomes while holding kinematic and dynamic features constant. In practice 
researchers have devised many ingenious ways to achieve this. In order to vary 
kinematic and dynamic features while holding action outcomes constant, in some studies 
a single action outcome is achieved using different effectors, hand, mouth or foot, say 
(Rizzolati et al. 1988, 2001; Cattaneo et ai 2010). A variation on this approach is to 
contrast performing a grasping action with different tools, so that the same action 
outcome might require closing or opening the hand depending on the tool used (Umhta et 
al 2008; Cattaneo et al. 2009; Rochat et al. 2010). In order to vary action outcome while 
holding kinematic and dynamic features constant, researchers have contrasted grasping 
movements with different distal outcomes such as eating and placing (Fogassi et al. 2005; 
Bonini et al. 2010; Cattaneo et al. 2007). Another approach is to contrast the same grasp- 
ing movements performed in the presence or manifest absence of a target object (Umilta 
et al. 2001; Vilhger et al. 2010). A related alternative is to contrast the same grasping 
movements in the presence of objects which could, or manifestly could not, be grasped 
by means of such movements (Koch et al. 2010). In each of these cases there is 
evidence that some markers of motor processing are correlated with action outcomes 
rather than narrowly kinematic or dynamic features of action. 
Thus, the hypothesis that motor representations denote action outcomes, and that these may 
come apart from narrowly kinematic or dynamic features of the action, is very popular. If we are 
to vindicate it, we are better off letting actions and tasks (coarsely individuated) be the referents 
of motor commands and assigning to methods the role of motor commands’ senses. 
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In conclusion, the two-dimensional model provides a more natural answer to the question 
“What is the meaning of motor commands?” than its obvious alternative. To summarize, my 
argument went as follows. According to the Explanatory Constraint, if motor commands are to 
play a role in satisfactory computational explanations of motor behavior, then motor commands 
must be representations, albeit prescriptive ones. Qua representations, they must have semantic 
properties. Hence, it makes sense to ask what their meaning is. According to the one-one model, 
a single motor command translates procedurally a basic intention. On this model, the 
denotational model has it that motor commands have tasks as their denotation — modeled as 
ordered sets of input-output. But this model is incomplete. Such tasks can be executed in 
accordance with different methods. So if the input to the motor system is to be unambiguous, the 
motor command must prescribe what method is to be used by the motor system for the execution 
of the task. Therefore, I suggested that a motor command represents a task in a particular way — 
i.e., as to be performed in accordance with a certain method. This conclusion suggests that the 
two-dimensional model is correct: a motor command denotes a task and expresses a meaning (or 
sense) that determines that task — their meaning being a method for performing that task. But 
methods are ways of breaking down a task into parts. And this structure must bottom out at some 
point — it must reach a set of elementary operations. Because the notion of an elementary 
operation is intrinsically relative, assignments of meanings to motor commands must be relative 
to the relevant system’s set of elementary abilities. An assignment of meaning to a command that 
is relative in this way to a set of elementary abilities is an assignment of practical meaning. In 
virtue of its practical meaning, relative to a system, a motor command represents a task in terms 
of operations that are elementary for that system. 
My argument relied on the one-one model and on the Explanatory Constraint. It is time to 
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discharge or to defend these assumptions. 
As I have observed at the outset, we could envisage the relation between the basic 
intentions and the motor commands to be one-many, as illustrated by Figure 7. On this model, a 
basic intention is translated into a complex representation, made out of an arrangement of motor 
commands, each corresponding to the elementary operations of the system. One might think that 
on this model, practical meanings are dispensable, for this complex representation can be simply 
assigned a structured task as its denotation – a structured task whose building blocks are 
operations that are in fact elementary for the system at a time. 
This way of looking at things is, however, misleading. On this one-many model, the 
question arises: In virtue of what does the motor planning map a certain basic intention into that 
particular complex representation? Part of the answer to this question must be that that particular 
complex representation represents the relevant task in terms of operations that the system can 
elementary perform. Hence, although this complex representation’s content can be thought of as 
a structured task, structured out of those elementary operations, what determines that it have as 
its content that particular structured task is the particular way in which the task is broken down 
by the motor planning into operations that are elementary for the system. But, as we have seen, a 
way of breaking down a task into operations that are elementary for the system is nothing else 
but a practical meaning. Hence, also on the one-many model, we get practical meanings back 
into the picture, playing on this model the meta-semantic role of fixing the denotation of the 
complex motor representation. Therefore, on the one-many model too, practical meanings play a 
role in the explanation of motor behavior, although a role that is more similar to that of a 
Kaplanian character than to that of a Fregean sense (Figure 14).
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  Figure 14: Sequence 
The last assumption left to discuss is what I called the Explanatory Constraint. According 
to it, motor commands are representations and they ought to have content for them to play a role 
in a satisfactory psychological account of motor behavior. The Explanatory Constraint may seem 
problematic for it appears to rely on Fodor (1981)’s claim that there is no computation without 
representation. And this Fodorian claim has been widely criticized. Several people have pointed 
out that computation can be given a purely formal characterization. Egan (1995) has argued in 
favor of a purely formal and mathematical individuation of computational states and of 
computation. Piccinini (2008) has argued in favor of a functionalist understanding of 
computation that does not invoke any semantic properties. Finally, Chalmers (2011) proposes a 
causal individuation of states implementing a computation, and he points out that such 
implementing states may or may not have semantic properties.
I am sympathetic to these criticisms of the Fodorian claim that computation qua 
computation requires representation. But let me emphasize that the Explanatory Constraint is 
independent of this Fodorian claim. One might agree that computation can be given a purely 
formal characterization yet also insist that cognitive systems only compute representations 
(Newell and Simon 1976, Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, Peacocke 1995, Peacocke 1999), on the 
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ground that only computation over representations suffices for cognition and mentality. Or one 
might follow Chalmers (2011) in taking computational psychological explanations to appeal to 
the physical states that implement a computation, formally characterized, and at the same time 
letting these physical states to have semantic properties. 
To my mind, both of these approaches offer valuable ways of motivating and 
understanding the Explanatory Constraint. On these two ways of understanding the Explanatory 
Constraint, however, the question does arise: why think of the motor system as a cognitive 
system — i.e. as something whose output has mental and semantic properties? 
The answer to this question is that, as we have seen for example in the discussion of 
Gallese and Metzinger (2003) and Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2011), psychological explanations 
where the motor system features are supposed to be explanations of actions — or tasks. Actions 
or tasks cannot be explained simply as the outcome of a purely formally characterized 
computation. Actions are physical events that are goal-directed. As such, they are intentional 
under some description. (Recall Gallese and Metzinger’s 2003 characterization of the output of 
the motor system as actions mentioned above; they argue, “specific subset of goal-directed 
movements [are] a series of movements that are functionally integrated with a currently active 
goal representation as leading to a reward constitute an action.”) Hence, no purely formal 
characterization of the computation that outputs them can explain them, for it would miss out on 
their semantic properties. Thus, it is because of the nature of the outputs of the motor system that 
psychological explanations of these outputs need to appeal to the semantic properties of the 
states involved in the explanation. Motor commands must be representations, thus have content, 
if they can be employed in an adequate psychological explanation of its intended explananda.
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3 The Intelligibility of Practical Meanings
3.1 An Example of Practical Meanings
In the last section, I have argued that computational explanations of motor behavior must appeal 
to practical meanings, for they need motor representation and the best account of the content of 
motor representation is in terms of practical meanings. 
Practical meanings are ways of breaking down tasks into subtasks that a system can 
elementarily perform. So, assignments of practical meanings are relative to a system’s stock of 
elementary abilities. According to this definition, the notion of practical meaning is general and 
not restricted to representations of motor tasks. The definition can then be extended to 
representations of tasks such as adding and multiplying or of any other task, including those that 
are elementary for a system (in this case, a practical meaning is a way of breaking the task into 
no parts). Because of this generality, practical meanings promise to play a role in computational 
explanations of tasks that involve procedural systems other than the motor system (cfr. Pavese 
2018).
In Pavese 2015, 6-9, I have argued that operational approaches to the semantics of 
programming languages, famously proposed and developed by Plotkin (1981, 2004), are an 
example of assignments of practical meanings to programming texts. What is distinctive about 
these sorts of semantics is that they assign to linguistic instructions (such as programming texts) 
complex semantic values that describe a task in terms of operations that a system can 
elementarily perform. Hence, they potentially assign different semantic values to the same 
linguistic instruction depending on the relevant set of elementary abilities.
For example, consider the following piece of programming text: 
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PROGRAM TEXT
MULT(n,m)
Suppose a system’s elementary operations include addition (ADD), assignment (SET v TO v1), 
and sequencing (;). If so, then an operational semantics will assign PROGRAM TEXT a complex 
semantic value (R-MULT) that describes multiplication in terms of those operations:
               if ⟨m=0, f⟩ ⟹ T,
                           ⟨MULT(n, m), f⟩ ⟶ ⟨res, f[0/res]⟩;
R-MULT=        if   ⟨m =0, f⟩ ⟹ F, 
        ⟨MULT(n, m), f⟩ ⟶ ⟨SET v  to   MULT(n, m- 1);SET restoADD(n, v);res,f*⟩
where f* = f[n × (m - 1)/v][n + (n × (m - 1))/res].
R-MULT is an update function —i.e. a function that maps a configuration of a system 
into another configuration  that results from updating the input configuration by assigning 0 to 13
the result of multiplying n by m, if m is 0 (R-MULT1), or else by assigning the value of v to the 
 Configurations are indicated by an ordered pair of an instruction and an assignment function f assigning values to 13
variables in the instruction — e.g. ⟨MULT (n, m), f⟩.
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result res, after performing a series of additions of n to itself m − 1 times (R-MULT2).14
Consider now a different system, whose set of elementary abilities only includes the 
operation ADDn that updates a configuration in such a way to assign to the variable res the result 
of correctly adding n to itself m – 1 times in accordance with the rule R-ADDn:
R-ADDn = ⟨ADDn(m), f⟩ ⟶ ⟨res, f*⟩ where f* = f[n0+ …+ nm-1/res] 
Then an operational semantics will assign PROGRAM TEXT the following operational semantic 
value that describes multiplication in terms of ADDn (m):
                                    If ⟨ADDn(m), f⟩ ⟶ ⟨res, f*⟩, then
R-MULT*= 
                             ⟨MULT(n, m), f⟩ ⟶ ⟨res, f*⟩
By possibly assigning different operational semantic values to the same instruction depending on 
a system’s elementary abilities, this sort of semantics illustrates the relativity of practical 
meanings.
 In Pavese 2015, 7-8, I characterized operational semantic values as inference rules. That way of thinking of 14
operational semantic values is encouraged by their employment in proof systems for proving certain structural and 
semantic features of programs. Here, I describe them instead as update functions from configurations to 
configurations. There is no contradiction, as inference rules can themselves be thought of as update functions of sort. 
See Pavese 2016.
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Let me highlight a further feature of this semantics. Consider again R-MULT. R-MULT 
is a complex update function that is composed out of simpler update functions (ADD, SET v TO 
v1, and ;) that the system has to compute in order to multiply two numbers. So, in effect, such an 
operational semantic value is a way of breaking down multiplication into sub-tasks that the 
system can elementarily perform.
Second, operational semantics is fully compositional in that the operational semantic 
values of complex instructions is fully determined by the operational semantic values of simpler 
instructions together with the structure of those complex instructions.
By satisfying the conditions of structure and relativity, operational semantics provides a 
perfect example of an assignment of practical meanings to commands in a programming 
language.
3.2 Elementary Abilities
An assignment of practical meanings is relative to a system’s elementary abilities — so that the 
same command may be assigned different practical meanings if it were fed into two systems that 
differ in their elementary abilities.
This characterization of practical meanings essentially appeals to the notion of 
elementary abilities. But is it legitimate positing such elementary abilities? 
Fodor (1968) invoked elementary operations and elementary abilities in a defense of the 
intelligibility of computational explanations of behavior against the proliferation of homunculi 
objection. According to this objection, a computational explanation of, for instance, how we tie 
our shoes appealing to sub-systems that do it for us is problematic, for it invites the further 
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question: “How do those subsystems do it?,” leading to positing a further layer of subsystems, 
and so on ad infinitum. Fodor (1968, p. 629) responded to this sort of objection that the 
proliferation of homunculi is to be stopped by positing elementary operations, where an 
elementary operation is one with “no theoretically relevant internal structure,” that a system 
performs “in no way at all” and for which “certain kinds of “how to” questions cannot arise 
about it:” 
[…]If every operation of the nervous system is identical with some sequence of 
elementary operations, we get around proliferating little men by constraining a 
completed psychological theory to be written in sequences of elementary instructions 
(or, of course, in abbreviations of such sequences).
Following Fodor, elementary operations and elementary abilities are theoretical posits that are 
needed if we are to make sense of the possibility of computational explanations of behavior. It 
seems utterly appropriate to appeal to such theoretical posits, if our goal is to provide a theory of 
the meaning of motor commands as they figure in computational models of explanation. Hence, 
it seems utterly appropriate to appeal to elementary abilities in our semantics of motor 
commands.
Given that we need elementary operations in order to stop the proliferations of 
homunculi/sub-systems and hence in order to stop an infinite regress, a second question arises: 
what sorts of abilities must a system’s set of elementary abilities include in order for them to play 
this theoretical role? 
 Suppose the system can elementarily perform A and can elementarily perform B but does 
not know how to perform A and B in a sequence. In this case, again, a regress is triggered: the 
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system would need to be told how to combine A and B and, if that method itself has parts, the 
system will need to know how to combine those parts in order to combine A and B. In order to 
stop this new sort of regress, we must add, to the elementary operations of a system, its primitive 
modes of combination. These modes of combination have a structure by which elementary tasks 
of the system are combined into complex ones. For example, computer’s primitive modes of 
combination usually include sequencing, as well as loops, if-then commands, and while-
commands:
(i) sequence: execute A; B; by executing A; then executing B;
(ii) loop: execute A; B; by executing A; then executing B;
(iii) if-command: execute A if C obtains;
(iv) while-command: execute A while executing B.
Accordingly, we should think of methods as ways of breaking down tasks into parts that 
are elementary for a system and that are combinable in accordance with that system’s primitive 
modes of combinations. I call the set of abilities to perform elementary tasks and to combine 
elementary tasks in accordance with a system’s primitive modes of combinations a system’s set 
of primitive abilities. Only methods thus conceived are plausible candidates for being practical 
meanings.
3.3 Modeling practical meanings
Practical meanings are ways of breaking down a task in terms of parts that a system can 
elementary perform and puts together in accordance with primitive modes of combination. But 
how can these ways of breaking down a task be modeled formally?
 34
By analogy with operational semantic values, we can model them as complex update 
functions — composed out of simpler update functions — in which the output configuration 
results from updating the input configurations with a series of operations. Such update functions 
are to be finely individuated in that their identity depends not only on their inputs and outputs but 
also on their structure — i.e., on how they are composed out of simpler update functions.
An intensionalist understanding of functions is particularly suited for our purposes. 
According to extensionalists, functions are just sets of ordered pairs of inputs and outputs. 
According to intensionalists, functions’ types are to be individuated more finely in terms of their 
structure — i.e., in terms of how they describe the way the output is to be reached. For example, 
the function x + 2 and the function x + 1 + 1 are different, even though they are extensionally 
equivalent (Church 1940; Church 1973; Church 1974), for their structure is different: while the 
former is identical to the operation of adding 2, the latter is composed out of two successive 
operations of adding 1. That holds for operational semantic values too: R-MULT is a different 
operational semantic value from R-MULT*, for it is composed out of different update functions. 
Understood as such, ways of describing a task in terms of its parts record the task’s structure in 
the way desired.
To sum up: an assignment of practical meanings will assign an instruction a way of 
breaking down a task in terms of subtasks that a system can primitively perform and that can put 
together in accordance with a system’s primitive modes of combination. In this sense, an 
assignment of practical meanings is relative to a system’s set of primitive abilities.  Practical 
meanings can be modeled formally as update functions, provided that we construe these update 
functions in sufficiently fine-grained fashion and not simply as sets of input and output 
conditions.
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3.4. Two Construals of Practical Meanings and the Problem of Understanding
The relativity of an assignment of practical meaning to sets of primitive abilities can be 
conceived of in two different ways.
We may think of this set of primitive abilities as if it were a sort of context with respect to 
which a linguistic instruction can be semantically interpreted in a way analogous to how, in a 
Kaplanian semantics, sentences are assigned truth-conditions relative to a context.  In 15
determining the practical meaning of an instruction the set of primitive abilities plays, on this 
construal, a role analogous to that of a Kaplanian context (Kaplan 1979, 1989). This reading 
would amount to a context-relative construal of the idea of practical meanings.
According to a content-relative construal of practical meanings, on the other hand, the set 
of a system’s primitive abilities is not a context relative to which practical meanings are 
assigned. Instead, such a set of primitive abilities should be thought of as sorting practical 
meanings into types. What does that mean? Consider again the case of operational semantic 
values. As noted, operational semantic values can be thought of as update functions, and I gave 
some reasons in favor of an intensionalist construal of these update functions. But even among 
intensionalists about functions, there might be disagreement as to how finely functions are to be 
individuated. Responses to this question vary but it is not outlandish to think that functions 
should be typed by the set of primitive abilities that would be needed to compute them. In fact, it 
is quite usual among theoretical computer scientists to type functions on the basis of the number 
of steps that a machine would take to compute them (cfr. Girard 1989). Because the number of 
steps will vary as a function of a machine’s primitive abilities, this way of typing would amount 
 Cfr. Kaplan 1989.15
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to individuating functions by sets of primitive abilities.
I want to be neutral between the context-relative and the content-relative construal of 
practical meanings. But let me point out that they are quite substantially different. A way to 
highlight their difference is by looking at how these two construals deal with a possible objection 
to the intelligibility of practical meanings.
In order to introduce the objection, let me consider an argument in Pavese 2015, 
according to which what makes practical meanings distinctively practical is that one cannot 
understand them in the relevant sense without being endowed with the ability to perform a 
certain task. For example, a system cannot understand R-MULT without being endowed with the 
ability to multiply two numbers, precisely because such a rule breaks down the task into parts 
that a system can primitively perform.
One might object to this claim. Is it really true that a system cannot understand practical 
meanings without acquiring the ability to perform the relevant task? Take, for instance, 
operational semantic values that I claimed to be examples of practical meanings. Programmers 
use operational semantic values all the time, so they, plausibly, understand them. Yet, they are 
not necessarily enabled to perform the same task that computers they program can perform. So, 
one might object on this ground to the intelligibility of practical meanings.
The response to this objection depends on one’s preferred construal of practical 
meanings. First, consider the context-relative view. One adopting this construal of practical 
meanings can respond that although programmers can understand operational semantic values 
without being endowed with the ability to perform the corresponding task, they cannot 
practically understand operational semantic values — cannot understand-them-under-a-certain-
set-of-primitive-abilities — without being endowed with that ability. Consider the analogy with a 
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Kaplanian semantics, which assigns a sentence “I am Italian” a certain proposition that x is 
Italian for a given contextual assignment of the speaker to x. Suppose the relevant proposition is 
the proposition that Giorgio is Italian. One may understand that same proposition without being 
the speaker of the context, as when Ale thinks of Giorgio’s nationality. But one cannot 
understand-it-under-the-character-of-the-context unless one is the speaker of the context. The 
same holds for this context-relative understanding of practical meanings: on this construal, 
practical meanings are semantic values of instructions that can be understood by systems which 
do not have the relevant set of primitive abilities but that cannot be understood-under-those-
primitive-abilities — in other words, they cannot be practically understood — by systems that 
do not have a certain set of primitive abilities.  However, if they are so practically grasped, they 16
do endow one with the ability to perform the corresponding task.
The relativist’s response is different. A relativist will deny that, in the circumstances 
envisaged, programmers necessarily understand the same function computed by the machines. 
For according to the content-relative view of practical meanings, the type of the function will be 
different if the set of primitive abilities is different because the type of the function itself is 
determined by that set. If so, then although certainly programmers grasp some function when 
they manipulate operational semantic values, they do not necessarily grasp the same function that 
is computed by the machines they program. By individuating functions finely in the way 
described above, we get a sort of content that is relative to sets of primitive abilities and is fine-
grained enough to guarantee that if one can understand that content at all, then one is endowed 
with the ability to perform the relevant task. Given these identity conditions, one can understand 
 In this sense, my account of practical meaning, when understood in this context-relative sense, provides a more 16
rigorous characterization of Stanley and Williamson (2001) and Stanley (2011)’s notion of practical modes of 
presentation.
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practical meanings at all only if one practically understands them.
4. Conclusions and open issues
Motor commands figure prominently in computational explanations of motor behavior. 
Following Tulving (1985, 387-8), we can think of motor commands as prescriptive 
representations. That raises the question: What is the best way of thinking of the content of these 
prescriptive representations?
In the first part of this essay, I have argued that, given the functional role of motor 
commands in computational models of motor behavior, an adequate semantics for motor 
commands is two-dimensional. The denotational model, on which motor commands denote 
tasks, is only partly correct. In addition to denoting tasks, motor commands have a further 
dimension to their meaning, if they have to play the functional role that computational models 
assign to them— if they are to be the output of motor planning and if they are to prescribe to the 
motor system the execution of the task. I argued that the right way to think of this further 
dimension of their meaning is in terms of practical meanings. That means that motor commands 
represent motor tasks in terms of operations that the system can elementarily perform and can 
put together through its primitive modes of combinations. Hence, by assigning a central role to 
motor commands and motor representations, computational explanations of motor behavior must 
invoke practical meanings. 
In the second part of this essay, I clarified this notion of practical meaning, I generalized 
it, and I defended it against an important objection. Having defended the explanatory relevance 
of semantic properties to a computationalist explanation of motor behavior (the Explanatory 
Constraint), my argument concludes that a psychological theory of motor competences based on 
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the computational models described here must assign a central explanatory role to practical 
meanings. 
Several issues are left open for future discussion (Pavese 2018). One is the following: one 
might wonder whether motor commands and motor representations themselves are really needed 
in an explanation of motor behavior. As we have seen, computational models of motor behavior 
do posit motor commands and so do posit motor representations. But could not we envisage 
computational models of motor behavior that assign no role to motor commands and to motor 
representations? On such models, presumably, the explicit representation of the agent’s intention 
would be processed by the motor system into the execution of the action without producing a 
motor representation as an intermediary step. 
Other philosophers have recently defended the need for motor representation, over and 
above the explicit representation of the subject’s intentions, for a satisfactory explanation of 
motor behavior (Butterfill & Signigaglia 2014, Levy 2016, Fridland 2017). An exhaustive review 
of this literature is beyond the scope of this essay.  Let me just mention a further possible line of 
argument in support of the indispensability of motor representation. Motor representation could 
be shown to be indispensable in an explanation of motor behavior if cases of goal-directed motor 
behavior that are nonetheless involuntary were observable. In this case, an explanation of the 
goal-directedness of the motor behavior would demand positing a representation of the motor 
goal that is, nonetheless, distinct from the agent’s intentions. Recent empirical work on motor 
skill suggests that we do observe instances of dissociation between an agent’s intentions and 
goal-directed motor behavior (Mazzoni and Krakauer 2006). I leave the discussion of these 
empirical findings for future work (cfr. Pavese 2018). I also leave it to future work to discuss 
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whether practical meanings could figure as building blocks of thoughts  and to discuss their role 17
in an account of the interaction between procedural systems and declarative systems — that is, in 
a solution of Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014)’s interface problem.18
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